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                                        Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the demand for local public school expenditures 
in Sweden. By using survey data, a method previously never applied to 
Swedish data, the paper provides an additional piece of evidence on 
individual demand for publicly provided local services. Estimating a linear 
demand specification, we find that the demand is inelastic with respect to 
income and tax, much in line with previous Swedish findings in a median 
voter framework. Estimation of a log-linear demand specification indicates 
more elastic demand. Testing the hypothesis that municipal employees tend to 
have a higher demand for public spending than others, we conclude that 
income, as well as taxprice, enters the demand function differently for the two 
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1.   Introduction 
The provision of public schooling is an essential building stone in the Swedish welfare society. 
As for many other publicly provided services, the municipalities have been given the 
responsibility of supplying primary and upper secondary schooling
1. Evaluating the efficiency 
of local public provision of schooling is an issue of central concern, not least since spending on 
schools constitutes the largest single item of Swedish local government expenditures. However, 
the task is problematic, since there is no market in which individuals’ demand can be observed. 
Estimating individuals’ preferences and their corresponding income and taxprice elasticities is 
a necessary first step towards such an evaluation. The purpose of this paper is to use survey 
data, a method never previously applied to Sweden, in order to investigate the demand for 
schooling. In particular, we will (i) estimate the income and taxprice elasticities and (ii) 
examine whether municipal employees, because of their high stake in municipal spending on 
schools, have significantly higher demand for local public school expenditures than others.  
 
Using survey data is one way to estimate the demand for publicly provided local goods. Other 
alternatives are the median voter model, the hedonic approach and the random utility model. 
These methods have earlier been applied to Swedish data by, e.g., Aronsson & Wikström 
(1996), Dahlberg & Jakobsson (2000), Boije (1997), and Boije & Dahlberg (1997). All four 
methods have their weaknesses, but taken together they will hopefully give us a better 
understanding of the demand for publicly provided goods at the local level in Sweden. This 
paper gives an additional piece of evidence, and we will relate our findings to those of the 
earlier Swedish studies. In addition, we will discuss our results in relation to earlier US-
studies that employ survey data to estimate demand for local public school expenditures, e.g. 
Bergstrom, Rubinfeld & Shapiro (1982), Gramlich & Rubinfeld (1982), Rubinfeld, Shapiro & 
Roberts (1987), Bergstrom, Roberts, Rubinfeld & Shapiro (1988)
 and Rubinfeld & Shapiro 
(1989).
2   
 
We use data from 1991, the year when the responsibility for providing primary and upper 
secondary education was decentralized to the local level. At this time, the share of pupils 
                                                 
1 The primary education is compulsory, and covers the first to the ninth grade. In 1991, the upper secondary 
school comprised two to three years of theoretical or vocational education. 
2 Survey data has also been applied by Preston & Ridge (1995) on UK data, by Rongen (1995) on Norwegian 
data, by Shapiro & Papadakis (1993) on Australian data and by Schokkaert (1987) on Belgian data.   3
attending private schools was negligible. Despite decentralization, the provision of a minimum 
standard of education to all – irrespective of income or residence – remained a national policy 
objective. This was to be achieved through a grant system, with the aim of canceling out 
differences in per capita costs across municipalities due to such factors as geographic location 
or demographics. Despite this, the variation in local per capita spending on schools has been 
significant, warranting an investigation of the preferences for local public school expenditures. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the theoretical model. In 
section 3, we describe and discuss the data. Section 4 reports and interprets the results, while 
section 5 extends the analysis by testing for differences in demand between public and private 
employees. In section 6, finally, we briefly compare our results with those of earlier US- and 
Swedish studies. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. A Model of the Demand for Schooling 
 
2.1 Theoretical model 
Assume that the individual ( i)  receives utility from private consumption  ( ) i C  and publicly 
provided education, measured by per capita spending on primary and upper secondary 
education  ( ) i G  in  i’s home municipality. The individual maximizes the following utility 
function 
 
( ) i i i G C U U , =       (1) 
 
subject to her private budget constraint 
 
    i i i y t C ) 1 ( - =       (2) 
       
as well as the municipal budget constraint 
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i i i i i i i S N y N t G N + =        (3) 
 
where  i t  denotes the local tax rate,  i N  the population in the municipality,  i y  the municipality 
mean income and  i S  the per capita central government grants targeted to schools in i’s home 
municipality. Inserting (3) in (2) yields 
 
    i i i i i i S y G C t t + = + .      (4) 
 
From equation (4) we can see that the price for schooling will be given by the individual’s 
taxprice  i i i y y = t  and that the individual’s income will consist of two terms; personal income 
and the individual’s share of public income,  i is t . Inserting (4) in (1) and assuming some 
specific functional form for the utility function, we can derive a demand equation. We will use 
two different specifications; a log-linear demand specification as well as a linear.  
 
2.1.1 Log-linear demand specification
3 
Studies investigating the demand for schooling typically use a log-linear demand specification, 
and we will start by following these papers. The log-linear specification is globally consistent 
with maximizing a Cobb-Douglas utility function with unitary price- and income elasticities.
4 
We will however not restrict the elasticities to one, but rather investigate if this is really the 
case.  
 
In the log-linear case individual i’s demand for local public school spending, 
*





ij j i i i i i x s y G e b t b t b b ln ln ) ln( ln
3
2 1 0
* - + + + + = ￿
=
,   (5) 
 
where the definition of the taxprice and the individual’s income is defined as in (4). 
Furthermore,  i x  is a  1 · J  vector of socio-economic variables, b  a vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and  i e ln  is an independently and identically distributed random variable. Using this 
                                                 
3 This is the same approach as in, e.g., Bergstrom, Rubinfeld & Shapiro (1982). 
4 See Rubinfeld (1987) for a discussion of this.   5
demand specification the elasticities are represented by the coefficients  j b , which makes them 
easy to calculate.  
 
2.1.2 Linear demand specification 
As an alternative to the log-linear specification we also estimate a linear model. Assuming a 
specific form of the utility function
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2 1 0
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with the same definitions of taxprice, income and socio-economic variables as in the log-linear 
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In our data, we do not observe 
*
i G  directly. What we do observe is whether individuals are 
satisfied with the home municipality’s efforts, or if they want the municipality to spend more or 
less than at present. Combined with information about the actual level of spending, we can 
estimate individuals’ preferences using an ordered logit model. Next, we will describe how 
this is done.  
 
Let us, for simplicity, assume that we have the following simple log-linear demand 
specification  
   
                                                 
5 This type of utility function is the same as used in the labor supply literature by, e.g., Hausman (1980). See 
Dahlberg & Jakobsson (2000) for the formula. 




ik k i z G e b b ln ln
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0
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where  i z  is a vector of regressors. 
 
Let  i G  denote actual spending in the municipality where i lives. Assume that individuals will 
express dissatisfaction with the level of public spending if  i G  deviates from 
*
i G  with a 
sufficiently large fraction, which we denote  d . Hence, individuals will answer ”increase 
spending ” if  i i G G d >
* , ”satisfied” if  i i i G G G d d £ £
*  and ”decrease spending” if  d i i G G <
* .  
 
Inserting this into (8) and rearranging gives: 
   
”more” if   i
K
k
ik k i G z ln ln ln
1
0 - - + < ￿
=
d b b e       (9) 
”less” if   i
K
k
ik k i G z ln ln ln
1
0 - + + > ￿
=
d b b e       (10) 
”same” if  i
K
k
ik k i i
K
k




0 - + + £ £ - - + ￿ ￿
= =
d b b e d b b   (11) 
 
If we assume that  i e ln  follows a logistic distribution with zero mean and variance 
2
e s ,  s ei ln  
will have a logistic distribution with zero mean and unit variance. Knowing this, we  can 
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where  ( ) ￿ F  denotes the cumulative distribution function.  
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Estimation of an ordered logit model yields the coefficients ( s bk ) and ( s 1 ), from which the 
elasticities of interest,  k b , can be obtained.  The estimation process also produces two 
”intercept terms”, in which the threshold value is included; ( s d s b ln 0 + ) and 
( s d s b ln 0 - ). 
 
If we instead have a linear demand specification, we proceed in the same way; that is, we 
combine the actual spending level in the home municipality with the answers given in the survey 
to identify the individuals’ demand and elasticities. More specifically, an individual is assumed 
to answer ”urgent to do more” if  d + > i
*
i G G , ”satisfied” if  d d + ‡ ‡ - i
*
i i G G G , and 
”efforts should be diminished if  d - < i
*
i G G . 
7 
 
3.  Data 
In this study we combine survey data from the Local Citizen Survey
8 with municipal data. The 
survey consists of data on 7550 individuals living in 28 Swedish municipalities.
9 It includes 
                                                 
7 Note that the interpretation of d  differs from above; there it was a proportion now it is a sum. In order to get 
a comparative expression summarize d  and 
i G  and divide by 
i G .  
8 The principal investigator was Folke Johansson at the Department of Political Science, Göteborg University. 
The data sets are handled and distributed by the Swedish Social Science Data Service (SSD) at Göteborg 
University. A detailed description of the sample procedure and construction of the survey is available in 
Johansson, Lorentzon & Strömberg (1993). 
9 The municipalities are the following: Upplands-Väsby, Nacka, Tierp, Uppsala, Enköping, Katrineholm, Eksjö, 
Kalmar, Staffanstorp, Kävlinge, Sjöbo, Trelleborg, Munkedal, Göteborg, Lysekil, Ale, Tranemo, Grästorp, 
Töreboda, Lidköping, Kil, Surahammar, Västerås, Härjedalen, Sorsele, Kalix, Gällivare, Luleå.   8
information on individual specific characteristics such as the respondents’ age, sex, income
10, 
type of employment and presence of children in the family. After deleting observations where 
we have missing values on at least one of the variables of interest, we are left with 2298 
observations
11. The respondents are asked about their preferences for publicly provided local 
services. More specifically, they are asked the following question: 
 
(Q1)  On this card are shown certain things for which the municipalities are responsible. 
Please indicate for each and every one of them whether you feel that it is urgent 
that your municipality does more than it is doing at present, that generally speaking 
things are satisfactory at present, that the municipality’s efforts should be 
diminished, or that you have no opinion about it. 
 
a.  School 
b.  Child care 
c.  Elderly care 
d.  Culture 
e.  Roads 
f.  Social assistance 
 
The question above has one important shortcoming, it does not link an increased level of 
services to a corresponding tax increase. In order to control for the individual’s willingness to 
pay for announced preferences, we need to use more information from the survey. The question 
stated below serves our purposes; 
 
(Q2)  Consider the following claim: It is more urgent to lower the local taxes than to 
raise the level of local services. Do you 
 
a.  agree completely 
b.  agree on the whole 
c.  disagree on the whole 
d.  disagree strongly 
e.  have no opinion 
 
                                                 
10 The survey data provides observations from a single year. If the individuals’ income significantly deviates 
from the permanent income during the year of observation, the income elasticity can be expected to be 
understated
 (See Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1982, for a discussion).    9
 
If an individual considers it ”urgent the municipality does more than at present” with respect to 
schools, but at the same time agrees (completely or on the whole) with the claim in Q2, one 
would suspect that this person would have expressed a different opinion in Q1, had this 
question been linked to increased taxes. In order to capture individuals’ preferences for 
schooling, we therefore combine the answer in Q1 to the one in Q2.
12 
 
In doing this, we need to consider that question Q2 is not specifically linked to schooling, but to 
local services in general. Consequently, a respondent considering it ”more urgent to lower 
local taxes than to raise the level of local services”, may refer to the level of all local services 
but schooling. We take this possibility into account by relating the answer given with respect to 
schooling (alternative Q1a) to the individual’s average preference for local public spending, 
which we calculate by using the answers to Q1a-f. 
13 Thus, we control for the individual’s 
willingness to pay in the following way: 
 
 
A. If the individual  
I)  answers Q1a with ”more” or ”same”,  
II)  answers Q2 with ”agree completely”, and 
III)  expresses lower or the same preferences for schooling than for the     
                          average public service, 
    we interpret this as a preference for less spending on schools 
 
B. If the individual  
I)  answers Q1a with ”more”,  
II)  answers Q2 with ”agree on the whole”, and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
11 The individuals left out of the sample due to missing values are equally distributed across municipalities and 
with respect to socio-economic characteristics. 
12 It could also be argued that the individuals answering Q1a with ”urgent the municipality does more” 
expresses an opinion for organizational change - which does not require an increase in the tax rate - rather than 
more spending. In particular, this could be the case if they also agree with the claim in Q2. Using the answers to 
an additional survey question, relating to school quality, we could conclude the following; only a very small 
fraction – 4.6 percent – of the respondents in this “critical group” expressed dissatisfaction with the school 
quality. This might be an indication that interpreting ”urgent to do more” as a preference for increased spending 
is not too problematic.  
13 The preferences for the average public service is calculated by coding each answer as 1 if the individual 
expresses a preference for less spending, as 2 if the individual is satisfied and as 3 in case of a preference for 
more spending. Having done this, the mean is calculated, yielding a value ranging from 1 to 3, to be compared 
with the answer given on question Q1a  (also ranging from 1 to 3). 
   10
III)  expresses lower or the same preferences for schooling than for the   
                          average public service 
    we interpret this as if the individual is satisfied and has a preference for the same level 
of   
    spending on schools 
 
 
C. If the individual  
I)  answers Q1a with ”same”,  
II)  answers Q2 with ”agree on the whole”, and 
III)  expresses lower or the same preferences for schooling than for the  
                            average public service, 
    we interpret this as a preference for less spending on schools 
 
D.  Otherwise we assume that the answer given in Q1a directly expresses the individual’s    
       preferences. 
 
In Table 1 we present the resulting frequencies of ”less”, ”more” and ”same”  –answers, 
divided according to employment status, sex, voting behavior, taxprice and income.  
 
The figures in Table 1 indicate that public employees in general want more spending on schools 
than private employees, women want more than men and left-wing voters want slightly more 
spending than right-wing voters. The higher income people have, the more public spending on 
schools is preferred. The same is, somewhat surprisingly, true for the taxprice; the larger 
proportion of higher public spending that the individual has to pay, the more spending is 
preferred. These figures do however not control for the actual level of spending in the 
municipalities, and must be interpreted with care. 
 
The municipal data set includes local school expenditures per capita, mean income, per capita 
grants targeted to education, and population (see Table A.1 in the appendix for a complete list 
of variables and Table A.2 for summary statistics).
14 Using school expenditures instead of 
output, which is hard to measure, will give biased estimates if variations in actual spending are 
influenced by cost differences across communities rather than purely quantitative differences. 
Teachers’ wages constitute a significant part of the production cost and it could be a problem if 
                                                 
14 Source: Kommunförbundet and Statistics Sweden (1992).   11
wages differ much across municipalities for teachers of the same ”quality” (education and 
experience). In 1991 there was however a centralized system of wage bargaining for teachers 
and any observed differences in wage costs are more likely to represent differences in the 
number of teachers and their experience r ather than differing geographical wage setting 
strategies. In addition, any structural cost differences that the municipalities cannot influence, 
such as demographic and geographical factors, are to be compensated for through the grant 
system. In 1991, the municipalities received grants targeted to the school sector on the basis of 
structural factors such as the density of school-aged children in the community, the share of 
immigrant children in the population and the number and costs of programs run in upper 
secondary school. As these grants are included in our analysis, in a way that was specified in 
section 2, we should not expect the estimations to be biased due to structural cost differences.  
 
Table 1. Distribution of Preferences for School Expenditures 
    less  same  more  
Full sample  0.171  0.347  0.482 
Type of employee 
Public employees  0.132  0.328  0.540 
Private employees  0.203  0.344  0.453 
Sex 
Women  0.132  0.342  0.526 
Men  0.209  0.352  0.439 
Political preferences 
Left-wing voters  0.120  0.386  0.494 
Right-wing voters  0.212  0.313  0.475 
Income 
Income < 95000  0.171  0.401  0.427 
95000 > Income > 140000  0.150  0.350  0.500 
Income >140000  0.191  0.288  0.521 
Taxprice 
Taxprice < 0.68  0.168  0.395  0.438 
0.68 < Taxprice < 1.04  0.148  0.360  0.491 
Taxprice > 1.04  0.194  0.293  0.513 
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4. Empirical Results 
Let us now turn to the estimations. We have used two different specifications of the demand 
equation; a log-linear and a linear one. For both the log-linear and the linear specification we 
estimate a parsimonious model (Model 1) as well as an extended model (Model 2). The former 
includes only the variables needed for estimating the elasticities, i.e. spending per capita, 
income and taxprice.
  Model 2  also includes socio-economic individual specific variables. 
Some of these variables, e.g. age, are likely to be correlated with income. As a result, we 
should expect the income elasticity of demand to be less elastic in Model 2, reflecting a ’pure’ 
effect of a marginal change in the individual’s income on demand in contrast to the composite 
effect implied by Model 1. 
 
While the ordered logit estimates treat individual location as exogenous, the central argument in 
Tiebout (1956) is that those who are dissatisfied with the level of public spending in their home 
municipality will move to the municipality providing the mix of public spending and taxes most 
in accordance with their tastes. In fact, the endogeneity of location is the mechanism ensuring 
efficient provision of public services. If this ‘vote-with-your-feet’-mechanism worked 
perfectly, we would only observe ‘satisfied’-answers in our survey, which is not the case. 
Nevertheless, as long as there is some truth in the Tiebout model, we risk getting biased 
estimates if we do not control for potential Tiebout sorting.
15  In order to get consistent 
estimates, we applied the two-step procedure outlined in Rubinfeld  et al. (1987) to both 
models in the log-linear and the linear setup, respectively. In doing so, we could not reject the 
null of no Tiebout bias in any of the setups. Therefore we present the results from the 
estimations where we do not control for Tiebout sorting. A thorough description of the 
methodology used to test and control for Tiebout bias, the ensuing results and a discussion of 
these are given in the appendix. 
 
                                                 
15 Controlling for the so called Tiebout bias when estimating the demand for local school expenditures in 
Michigan, Rubinfeld et al. (1987) and Bergstrom et al. (1988) find that the results change dramatically taking 
this mechanism into account. Rubinfeld & Shapiro (1989), on the other hand, cannot reject the null that there is 
no Tiebout bias in school demand estimates for Massachusetts. Neither can Preston & Ridge (1994) when 
investigating the demand for local public spending in the UK.    13
The results from the estimations are presented in Table 2 and Table 3.
16 Let us begin our study 
of these by looking at the elasticities, presented in Table 2. In all four specifications, the 
elasticities have their expected signs. It turns out that it matters how we specify our model. The 
parsimonious models give higher elasticities both in the log-linear and the linear specification. 
As mentioned above, this is to be expected when socio-economic variables correlated with 
income is excluded in the parsimonious model. We can also note that the elasticities are lower 
when we choose a linear, instead of a log-linear, specification of the demand equation. For 
example, in the extended model, the income elasticity is  73 . 0  in the linear specification, to be 
compared with  13 . 1  in the log-linear one. The corresponding figures for the taxprice 
elasticities are  74 . 0 -  and  07 . 1 -  respectively. Any precise statements about the magnitude of 
the elasticities are, however, prevented by the relatively wide confidence intervals. Of the two 
specifications, the linear one is associated with somewhat smaller standard errors. Finally, it 
can be noted that in the case of the log-linear specification of  Model 1, neither the point 
estimate of the income elasticity, nor the corresponding tax price estimate, is significantly 
different from one (in absolute terms). Thus, the log-linear specification is consistent with a 
maximized Cobb-Douglas utility function. 
 
Turning to the socio-economic variables in Table 3 we find that, irrespective of whether the 
log-linear or the linear specification is used, being female, municipally employed, of working 
age and having children – in particular if these are of school age – increases the probability of 
demanding more school spending. In all setups, the coefficients have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant but in one case (the dummy indicating whether the individual is 60-70 
years of age). The three coefficients used for deriving the elasticities are throughout significant 
on a one-percent level, as are the elasticities. The negative sign preceding the spending 
coefficient tells us that a positive change in school expenditures decreases the probability of 
demanding more spending. Correspondingly, an increase in the taxprice decreases the 
                                                 
16 Bergström, Dahlberg & Johansson (1998) found different parameters on own income and grants when 
investigating Swedish municipal labor demand. Having this in mind, as well as the flypaper effect, we also 
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probability of demanding more spending, while the opposite interpretation is valid when 
individual income increases.  
 
Table 2. Elasticities for local school expenditures 
  Log-linear  Linear 
Elasticity  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
















Notes: i)  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level respectively. 
           ii) Standard error in parentheses 
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Table 3. Estimated demand for local school expenditures 
  Log-linear  Linear 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Ordered logit 
coefficients 
       
























Female    0.327*** 
(0.088) 
  0.278*** 
(0.088) 
Age_30    0.809*** 
(0.189) 
  0.791*** 
(0.186) 
Age_40    0.800*** 
(0.207) 
  0.842*** 
(0.207) 
Age_50    0.717*** 
(0.192) 
  0.787*** 
(0.191) 
Age_60    0.371* 
(0.198) 
  0.417** 
(0.198) 
Age_70    0.129 
(0.201) 
  0.167 
(0.200) 
Municipal    0.335*** 
(0.108) 
  0.358*** 
(0.108) 
Child    0.208* 
(0.120) 
  0.226* 
(0.119) 
School child    0.345*** 
(0.110) 
  0.341*** 
(0.110) 
0 b   -9.944  -4.554  11357.01  6606.555 
d   1.700  1.665  1.577  1.548 
N  2835  2298  2835  2298 
Log L  -2856  -2243  -2866  -2249 
LR chi2 (df)   75.69 (3)  192.52 (12)  55.93 (3)  180.68 (12) 
Notes: i)  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level respectively. 
           ii) Standard error in parentheses 
           iii) The LR-test tests the joint significance of all coefficients. 
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Does it matter how we specify the dependent variable? Running the ordered logit estimations 
on the basis of three alternative definitions of the dependent variable, the qualitative results do 
not change.
17 The estimated coefficients, elasticities and the associated standard errors are 
similar in magnitude, and the statistical significance remains the same. We therefore conclude 
that the results are not particularly sensitive to the definition of the dependent variable. 
 
5. Public and Private Employees 
 
Do public employees tend to have a higher demand for public spending than private employees 
have? Some support for this hypothesis was given by the above analysis, where the dummy 
reflecting whether an individual is municipally employed was statistically significant (on a one 
percent level), hence indicating that the constant in the demand equation differs for municipal 
employees and others.
18 Considering also the relatively high ratio of municipal employees to 
total employment in Sweden, amounting to more than 20 percent at the time of the survey, this 
issue seems relevant to investigate further. We will therefore devote this section to tests for 
differences in demand between public and private employees. 
 
There are several reasons to expect demand to differ between these two types of employees, 
one being that cutbacks in public spending might be associated with decreasing job security in 
the public sector. Another hypothesis is that public employees in general might be more prone 
towards public services because of, e.g., their political identification. In both these cases, this 
will be reflected by a differing constant in the demand equation for the two groups of 
employees. Just assuming public employees to have higher demand for public services because 
of some underlying taste parameter seems a bit unsatisfactory however. Courant, Gramlich and 
Rubinfeld (1979b) put forth a theoretical model where the reasons for differences in the 
demand equations are modeled more thoroughly.
19 In the model, differences in demand are due 
to differences in the budget constraints. The main mechanism is that the suppliers of the public 
goods are in part their own demanders, with the private sector having little to do but pay. 
Consider,  for example, public sector wages. For a private employee, higher public sector 
                                                 
17 These alternative ways of adjusting for the individual’s willingness to pay are summarized in Table A.3 in the 
appendix. The coefficient estimates and elasticities are available from the authors on request.  
18 We have chosen to use municipal employees rather than public employees (which also contains state and 
county employed) since they supply of education is a municipal matter. 
19 The same topic is discussed in Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979a) and in and Gramlich and Rubinfeld 
(1982).   17
wages mean that the public services have become more expensive and she will hence demand 
less public service. For a public employee, this is only one side of the coin, since higher public 
wages also imply higher income. As a consequence, the price elasticity will be less negative 
for public employees than for private employees and the income elasticity will be higher. 
 
Below we will test whether the hypothesis that demand differs for public and private 
employees is true in Sweden. More precisely, we will test if the intercept as well as the slope 
coefficients differ for people employed by the municipalities.
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where  i D  takes  the value 1 if the respondent is municipally employed, 0 otherwise. From 
equation (13), we see that there are least three potential hypotheses that we could be interested 
in testing: 
 
H1:  0 = g  
H2:  0 = l  
H3:  0 = j  
 
As always, when there are a number of different hypotheses one likes to test, there is the 
question of which order to test the hypotheses in. In Table 4 we describe the procedure we have 
chosen. We use the traditional LR-test given by 
 
) ln (ln
U R L L LR - - = 2 ,      (14) 
 
which under the null is distributed as 
2 c  with as many degrees of freedom as there are 
restrictions imposed.   18
Table 4. Tests of model specification 
    Log-linear model  Linear model 
  df
 
LR-test  P-value  LR-test  P-value 
i.  0 = g , given that  0 = =j l   1  352.25  1.00  357.88  1.00 
ii.  0 = l , given that  0 = =j g   2  355.32  1.00  367.67  1.00 
iii.  0 = j , given that  0 = = l g   8  361.74  1.00  368.32  1.00 
iv.  0 = l , given that  0 = j ,  0 „ g   2  3.74  0.698  11.43  0.999 
v.  0 = g , given that  0 = j ,  0 „ l   1  0.67  0.209  1.65  0.515 
vi.  0 = j , given that,  0 = l ,  0 „ g   8  10.11  0.736  11.103  0.804 
vii.  0 = j , given that,  0 „ l ,  0 = g   8  11.47  0.749  14.40  0.904 
 
 
Starting out with a model with no differences between municipal employees and the rest of the 
population, and testing whether the intercepts differ, we see from line i of Table 4 that we 
reject the null of equal intercepts. If we instead test whether the slope coefficients on income 
and taxprice differ (line ii) we reject the null in this case as well. In line iii we test the 
hypothesis that the socioeconomic variables have the same impact for the two different 
employee types. We reject this hypothesis as well.
 20 
 
Is it the case that both the intercept and the two slope coefficients are different for the two 
groups of employees? Assuming that the intercept differs and testing whether the slope-
coefficients for income and taxprice differ as well, we can reject the hypotheses that they do not 
differ (line iv) for the linear model but not for the log-linear one. On the other hand, assuming 
that that the slope coefficients differ and testing the null of equal intercepts, we cannot reject the 
null (line v) for neither of the models. For the linear model the conclusions from these tests are 
clear-cut; a model with differing coefficient on income and taxprice for municipal and non-
municipal employees seems to work best. For the log-linear case, things are not so obvious. 
Either we need differing intercept, in which case we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal 
coefficients for taxprice and income (see line iv). On the other hand, when allowing these two 
to differ, we cannot reject the null of equal intercepts (see line v). In order to choose which 
specification to work with, we have used the p-values as a guideline. Having a higher p-value 
for the test conducted in line iv than for the test conducted in line v, we are closer to reject the 
hypothesis tested in line  iv. Hence, we conclude that the model with equal intercepts but 
                                                 
20 In addition to the presented tests, we have also tested the hypotheses that all parameters differ, that only 
taxprice differ and, finally, that only the parameter estimate on income differs. The results from these tests are 
in line with the results presented in Table 4 and are available upon request.   19
differing parameter coefficients for income and taxprice is the ”best” specification for the log-
linear model as well. 
 
Let us finally test for different slope coefficients on the socioeconomic variables. From lines vi 
and vii, we see that we cannot reject the null that they do not differ, neither when we allow for 
different intercepts for the two types of employees, nor when differing coefficients are allowed. 
Thus, we can conclude that income and taxprice enter differently for municipal employees, 
while the constant term seems to be the same across groups, as is the effect of the socio-
demographic variables. So in what way do the income and price elasticities differ? In Table 5 
we present the results from ordered logit estimations where we allow for different impact of 
income and taxprice for the two groups of employees.  
 
 
Table 5.  Estimated demand for local public school expenditures – municipal vs non-municipal employees  
  Log-linear   Linear  
  Estimate  Standard Error  Estimate  Standard Error 
Coefficient          
Spending  -1.691 ***  0.300  -0.00021 ***  0.000041 
Income
  1.939 ***  0.424  8.58E-06 ***  2.78E-06 
Taxprice  -1.867 ***  0.425  -1.203 ***  0.400 
Income * Munic
  1.974 ***  0.424  2.14E-05 ***  8.21E-06 
Taxprice * Munic  -1.673 ***  0.433  -2.442 ***  1.100 
Female  0.328 ***  0.088  0.281 ***  0.086 
Age_30  0.818 ***  0.189  0.800 ***  0.186 
Age_40  0.801 ***  0.207  0.832 ***  0.207 
Age_50  0.712 ***  0.192  0.761 ***  0.191 
Age_60  0.364 *  0.198  0.385 **  0.198 
Age_70  0.128  0.201  0.156  0.201 
Children  0.207 *  0.120  0.227 **  0.119 
Sch_child  0.349 ***  0.110  0.346 ***  0.110 
0 b   -4.739  --  6660.441  -- 
d    1.663  --  1.550  -- 
N  2298  --  2298  -- 
Log L  -2241.09  --  -2243.65  -- 
LR chi2 (df)  195.59 (13)  --  190.47 (13)  -- 
Notes: i)  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level respectively. 
           ii) The LR-test tests the joint significance of all coefficients. 
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Table 6.  Elasticities for local public school expenditures – municipal vs non-municipal employees  
  Log-linear   Linear  
Elasticity  Estimate  Standard Error  Estimate  Standard Error 
Income  1.147 ***  0.294  0.723 ***  0.253 
Price  -1.104 ***  0.291  -0.739 ***  0.264 
Income, munic employed  1.167 ***  0.296  1.515 ***  0.642 
Price, munic.  employed  -0.989 ***  0.286  -1.266 **  0.614 
Note: i)  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level respectively. 
 
 
From Table 6, we see that whereas the income elasticity is higher for municipal employees than 
for others, the price elasticity is lower, even though the differences are very small for the log-
linear model. This is as we would expect from economic theory. Looking at the linear model, 
we see that the income elasticity for municipal employees is 1.52, to be compared with 0.72 for 
the rest of the population. The corresponding figures for the price-elasticities are  27 1. -  and 
74 0. - . These elasticities are however not significantly (in a statistical sense) different for 
municipal and non-municipal employees, because of the rather large standard errors. It is also 
worth noting that the elasticities for the non-municipal employees are very similar to the ones 
presented in Table 2. 
 
6. A comparative perspective  
 
A number of American studies estimate taxprice and income elasticities of local school 
expenditures using the same method as we do
21. Needless to mention, the US system differs 
considerably from the Swedish one, with respect to the school setting as well as other aspects. 
A comparison between studies applying the same method of estimation is nevertheless of 
interest. It is also of value to know whether our survey data estimates correspond to those found 
in earlier Swedish work, where other methods have been employed. 
 
                                                 
21 See Bergstrom et al (1982) for a comparison between macro and micro estimates and Inman (1979) for a 
review of demand estimates for public education as well as other local public services.    21
6.1. A comparison with American Studies 
In Table 7 we list American studies estimating a log-linear demand equation, using survey data. 
All of them examine the demand for schooling. 
 
In contrast to our findings, Rubinfeld et al. (1987) and Bergstrom et al. (1988) find evidence of 
Tiebout sorting, using Michigan survey data. Since our data contains a set of randomly chosen 
municipalities across the country, and only a few municipalities in the vicinity of the larger 
Swedish cities, it is likely that the mobility costs are considerably higher than in the Michigan 
data set. This might explain the divergent results. 
 
 
Table 7.  Estimated income/taxprice elasticities of demand for local school expenditures in studies applying 
US survey data on a log-linear demand specification 
Study  Income/taxprice elasticity 
Models that do no control for Tiebout sorting 
22 
Log-linear demand specification 
Bergstrom et al (1982)  Parsimonious model 
 0.83   /  -0.57    
Extended model 1 
0.49    /  -0.41 
Extended model 2 
0.38    / -0.43 
Gramlich & Rubinfeld (1982 )   Macro data using median income 
0.53/ 0.01 
Survey data, different models 
0.29—0. 409 / -0.011—0.014 
Rubinfeld & Shapiro (1989)  Parsimonous models 
0.83—0.93 / -0.57— -0.72  
Extended models 
0.38—0.72 / -0.43— -0.70  
Rubinfeld et al. (1987)  Extended  model 
0.32 /-0.32   
 
Models controlling for Tiebout sorting   
Bergstrom et al. (1988)  Extended model 
0.23  / -0.87 
Rubinfeld et al. (1987)  Extended model 
0.10 / -0.11  
 
 
                                                 
22 As the results from estimating a Tiebout corrected model are sensitive to the instrumental variables used, we 
believe that it is relevant to look at the estimates that do not control for potential Tiebout sorting as well.    22
How do the elasticities of the US-studies compare to ours? Bergstrom  et al. (1982) and 
Rubinfeld & Shapiro (1989) estimate a model similar to our parsimonious one (Model 1 in 
Table 3). As the resulting income elasticities (price elasticities) ranges from 0.83 to 0.93 (from 
-0.57 to -0.72), demand seems much less elastic than according to our findings where, in the 
log-linear case, the point estimates centers around 1.5, in absolute terms. 
 
Comparing the results of the extended models, it can be noted that the US estimations tend to 
control for a larger set of socio-economic variables than we do in  Model 2 .
23 Not taking 
potential Tiebout sorting into account, the point estimates of the income elasticity (taxprice 
elasticity) run from 0.29 to 0.72  (from  -0.01 to -0.72), while the Tiebout corrected estimates 
vary from 0.10 to 0.23 (from -0.11 to -0.87). Evidently, these results suggests considerably less 
elastic demand compared to our log-linear case, while the “uncorrected” results are not out of 
line with those of our linear demand specification.  
 
6.2 A Comparison with Swedish studies 
 
As mentioned above, there are four different methods available when estimating the demand for 
publicly provided goods, for which there is no market; the survey data method, used in this 
paper, the median voter model, the hedonic approach and the random utility model. Each of 
these methods has their strengths and weaknesses. With the results pointing in the same 
direction, however, we will have a more comprehensive picture of individual demand for local 
public goods in Sweden.  
 
In Table 8, we compare the results from this paper with the findings of earlier Swedish studies 
using other methods. One fundamental difference to our study is that these are based on macro 
or household data rather than micro data. Also, they focus on demand for local public services 
in general, and not on a specific sector such as education. This latter difference is to be kept in 
mind when interpreting the results. 
 
The models in the Swedish studies typically include variables reflecting household or 
municipal characteristics (see Table 8). Thus, a comparison of results should primarily focus   23
on those of our extended model (Model 2). Consistent with our findings, attributes such as 
municipal age structure, presence of children in the household and a woman head of the 





Table 8.  Estimated income/taxprice elasticities of demand for local public services in Sweden  
Study  Method  Year  Variables in demand 
function  
Income/taxprice elasticity 
Boije (1997)    Hedonic  1990  (i) Household attributes: 
INC, AGE, CHILD, SEX, 
MARITAL, SINGLE  
Dep. var: MARG PRICE 
OF LOCAL PUB 
SERVICES 
0.09 / -0.89 
 




1990  (ii) Municipal attributes: 
PRICE, INC, POL, AGE, 
DEM, REGIONAL  
Dep. var: LOCAL PUB. 
EXP. 
0.82/-0.53  Median voter model 
0.87/-0.53  General model 






(iii) Municipal attributes: 
INC, TAXPRICE, AGE, 
DEN.  
Dep. var: LOCAL PUB. 
EXP. 
Log-linear demand  
1.30 / -1.48 Fixed effect  
0.45/ -0.67 GMM, static 
0.47/ -0.74 GMM, dynamic  
Linear demand 
0.57/-0.91  Short run, dynamic 
0.83/-1.32  Long run, dynamic 
Ahlin & Johansson 
(2000) 
Survey data  1991  (iv) Individual attributes: 
INC, TAXPRICE, AGE, 
SEX, MUNIC EMPL, 
CHILD, SCHOOL 
CHILD. 
Dep. var: LOCAL PUB. 
SCHOOL EXP.  
Log-linear demand: 
1.13/ -1.07       
Linear demand: 
0.73/-0.74   
 (i) INC – disposable household income, AGE – age of the head of household, CHILD – no of children in 
household, SEX – dummy for female head of household, MARITAL – dummy for married head of household, 
SINGLE – dummy for one member household. 
(ii) PRICE – per capita tax base, INC – median income, POL – share of members in local council repr socialist 
parties, AGE – municipal age structure, DEM – size and density of municipal population, respectively, 
REGIONAL – dummy indicating geographic location, LOCAL EXP – total operating cost net of user fees.  
(iii) INC – median household income before tax + taxprice*grants, TAXPRICE – household median 




                                                                                                                                                                    
23 In the survey used in this study, the questions relating to, e.g., the educational level, occupational status 
(employed/unemployed/welfare receipent) and citizenship of the respondent contained too many missing 
observations for them to be included in the estimations.   24
 
Boije (1997) and Aronsson & Wikström (1996) both use the same municipal data set from 
1990. Relying on hedonic price functions, Boije’s results indicate substantially lower income 
elasticity than the median voter framework of Aronsson & Wikström, or in any of the other 
studies, while the price elasticity is higher. Relating these results to our point estimates, the 
price elasticity given by the hedonic approach is of a similar magnitude as that of the linear 
demand model. However, the income elasticity resulting from the linear specification, 
corresponds more closely to those of the median voter model.  
 
Dahlberg & Jakobsson (2000) take dynamics and endogeneity into account in a panel for the 
years 1981-1987. Like we do, they find that the log-linear demand specification is consistent 
with maximizing a Cobb-Douglas utility function with unitary income and price elasticities. The 
point estimates of Dahlberg & Jakobsson for the log-linear model are lower than ours. Their 
estimates of a linear demand specification on the other hand, are slightly higher, at least in the 
long run. Finally, when estimating a fixed effect log-linear model, they find somewhat more 
elastic demand than we do in our log-linear version of the extended model.  
         
7.   Conclusions 
In this paper, we have used survey data from 1991 to estimate individual demand for local 
public school expenditures. In particular, we have estimated income and taxprice elasticities. 
We have also tested the hypothesis that the preferences of municipal employees differ from 
those of other types of employees. When examining these two topics, we did not find any 
evidence of Tiebout sorting.  
 
In a log-linear setting, a model including individual specific socio-economic variables 
indicates rather elastic demand, both with respect to income and taxprice (1.13 and –1.07, 
respectively). We cannot reject the hypothesis that the elasticities differ from unity, which 
indicates that the log-linear demand specification is consistent with maximizing a Cobb-
Douglas utility function. Furthermore, demand is found to be considerably more elastic than in 
US-studies using survey data to estimate demand for local public school expenditures. In 
addition, our elasticities are higher than the ones typically found in earlier Swedish studies. 
Estimations of a linear demand specification indicate considerably less elastic demand (0.73 
and  –0.74, respectively), which to a large degree is consistent with previous findings for   25
Sweden based on a median voter framework, in particular in a setting where dynamics is 
controlled for.  Remember, however, that the earlier Swedish studies investigate total local 
public spending rather than school spending alone. 
 
From our analysis of whether there are significant differences in demand between municipally 
employed and others, we conclude that income as well as taxprice enter differently in the 
demand function for municipal employees. On the other hand, we cannot find evidence of 
differences with respect to the constant term, or the socio-economic variables. As predicted by 
theory, the income elasticity is higher for municipal employees than for others. The price 
elasticity associated to municipal employees is lower than for the other group of employees 
only in the log-linear specification. However, the latter differences are not significant, in a 
statistical sense.  
 
Besides employment status, being female, of working age and having children increases the 
probability of demanding more spending on schools. Not controlling for these individual 
characteristics yields considerably higher income and taxprice elasticities (in absolute terms). 
 
Evaluating the efficiency of local public provision of schooling cannot be accomplished by 
demand elasticities alone. An important task for future research is therefore to investigate the 
supply side more thoroughly. Also, from a comparative perspective it would be interesting to 
estimate the demand for total local public spending using survey data. Finally, a theoretical 
model explaining differences between private and public employees’ demand for public 
spending, adapted to the Swedish setting, would be a useful contribution to local public finance. 
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Appendix 
A.1. Variable definitions and summary statistics 
 
Table A.1 Definitions of variables 
TAXPRICE    respondent’s taxprice (respondent’s gross income/municipal mean income)  
INCOME
     (respondent’s gross income + taxprice*grants per cap) 
FEMALE     1 if female, 0 otherwise   
AGE_30    1 if the respondent is 20-29 years; 0 otherwise 
AGE_40    1 if the respondent is 30-39 years; 0 otherwise 
AGE_50    1 if the respondent is 40-49 years; 0 otherwise 
AGE_60    1 if the respondent is 50-59 years; 0 otherwise 
AGE_70    1 if the respondent is 60-69 years; 0 otherwise 
MUNIC    1 if employed by municipality; 0 otherwise   
CHILDREN    1 if children 0-6 years of age; 0 otherwise  
SCH_CHILD    1 if children under the age of 16; 0 otherwise   
SPENDING    municipal spending per capita on primary and secondary schools  
Instruments in ”Tiebout regressions” 
EDU_8990    percentage change in municipal spending on schools 1989-1990 
EDU_9091    percentage change in municipal spending on schools 1990-1991 
LOCAM    number of municipalities in the labor market area 
TRANSP    the number of kilometers of local public transportation per square kilometer  
                          in the county 




Table A.2 Summary statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
DEP VAR  2.311464  .7457188  1  3 
TAXPRICE  .9402138  .8090001  .0062972  25.2766 
INCOME  128641.4  116956.7  1022.029  3651313 
FEMALE  .4941799  .5000543  0  1 
AGE  43.2769  15.70113  18  80 
MUNIC  .2032737  .4025111  0  1 
CHILDREN  .2233918  .4166  0  1 
SCH_CHILD  .3109594  .462974  0  1 
SPENDING  7321.705  1019.107  5666  9618   29
 
A.2. Alternative definitions of the dependent variable 
 
Table A.3 Alternative ways of controlling for willingness to pay when the individual expresses lower or the 
same preferences for schooling than for the average public service  
 























”More”  Less  Same  Less  Less  Less  Same  Less  More 
”Same”  Less  Less  Less  Less  Less  Same  Less  Same 
Note: * See description on page 8. 
 
A.3. The Tiebout bias 
 
One potential problem with the ordered logit estimates is that they treat individual location as 
exogenous. If, however, people are dissatisfied with the level of spending (i.e. if  i i G G „
* ) they 
could simply move to a municipality where the level of services at the given taxprice is more in 
accordance with their tastes, as suggested in Tiebout (1956). Obviously, this ”vote-with-your-
feet”-mechanism is not likely to work perfectly, considering the costs associated with moving. 
However, even if this mechanism works only imperfectly, the ordered logit estimates may be 
subject to bias if Tiebout sorting is not controlled for.    
 
The problem with endogenous individual location can be illustrated in the following way. Let 
the individual’s optimal level of spending be given by the following demand equation  
 




i x G e b b + + = .      (A1) 
 
The mismatch between the demanded level and the actual level (denoted by  i G ) is given by 
 
    i i i i i v u x G G ” + + = - g g
'
0
* .    (A2) 
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Note that some  j b  and/or  j g  might be zero. The problem arises if  i G  and  i e  are correlated, in 
which case  i v  and  i e  will be correlated. In this case, the likelihood function will be much more 
complex than the one given in equation (12). Intuitively, if individuals’ choice of community is 
influenced by the preferences for school spending, the change in the probability that we will 
register a ”less”- or a ”more”-answer will be smaller for a given change in actual spending 
since people move if they are dissatisfied. Instead, we will tend to get ”same”-answers, i.e. the 
estimated coefficients tend to be underestimated. It is, however, not possible to predict a priori 
in which direction the elasticities will be biased, as these are calculated by dividing the 
(under)estimated income and taxprice coefficients by the (under)estimated spending coefficient.  
 
Testing and controlling for the existence of Tiebout bias involves a two-step procedure, which 
yields consistent estimates.
24 In a first step, per capita school spending is regressed on the 
explaining variables of the demand function,  i x , and on a vector of variables explaining the 
individuals’ decisions on where to live but not their demand for schooling,  i z : 
 
i i i i z x G w g b g b + + + + =
¢ ¢ ) ( 0 0       (A3) 
 
In a second step, the residuals( ) wi  resulting from this regression are included as an additional 
explaining variable in the original model. If this regressor enters positively and significantly we 
have evidence of sorting.  
 
For identification to be possible, we need at least one z-variable, i.e. at least one regressor 
explaining the mismatch but not the demand for schooling. Unfortunately, the results in earlier 
studies have turned out to be quite sensitive to the choice of instrumental variables. The 
instrumental variables we use include the degree of labor market opportunities (measured as the 
number of municipalities within the labor market area) and the availability of public 
transportation (defined as the number of kilometers of local public transportation per square 
kilometer in the county) as these are factors which are likely to influence residential choice, but 
not school demand. In addition, we use the degree of heterogeneity in the population (defined as 
the standard deviation of personal income in the municipality) as, in the presence of moving 
                                                 
24 See Rubinfeld et al. (1987) for the exact likelihood function and a description of the two-stage procedure 
used to estimate this.    31
costs preventing perfect sorting, the level of public services is more likely to deviate from an 
individual’s preferred level if the community is of a heterogeneous composition than if it is 
homogenous. By the same token, the percent of change in per capita local school expenditures 
over the previous years is suitable as instrument.  Since moving is costly, people might chose 
not to move even if the actual level of spending changes and thereby deviates from the 
individual’s most preferred level. In a municipality where the spending level has changed a lot, 
there are more likely to be many inhabitants who are dissatisfied. The results from these 
regressions are given in Table A.4. 
 
In Table A.5 and Table A.6 the results from the ordered logit estimations are reported. We see 
the same result occurring in a ll of the setups; the ”Tiebout residual” is positive, but not 
statistically significant. Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no Tiebout bias. 
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Table A.4 First-step regression testing for Tiebout bias 
  Log-linear  Linear 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Income
















 Female    -0.002 
(0.005) 
  -56.082 
(38.418) 
Age_30    -0.026** 
(0.011) 
  -117.784 
(86.828) 
Age_40    1.172e-04 
(0.012) 
  95.865 
(94.495) 
Age_50    -0.003 
(0.011) 
  67.738 
(88.752) 
Age_60    -0.003 
(0.012) 
  33.048 
(92.618) 
Age_70    -0.007 
(0.012) 
  17.378 
(94.282) 
Munic    -0.008 
(0.006) 
  -18.898 
(46.186) 
Child    0.004 
(0.007) 
  -22.125 
(50.333) 
Sch_child    -0.004 
(0.006) 
  -33.012 
(46.950) 

















































(144.953)   33
N  2835  2298  2835  2298 
  F-value   280.72  100.61  191.21  67.77 
 R2adj   0.409  0.410  0.320  0.317 
   Notes: i)  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level respectively. 
              ii) Standard error in parentheses   34
Table A.5 Estimated demand for local public school expenditure, Second-step regression testing for Tiebout bias 
  Log-linear  Linear 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Coefficient 
estimates 
       

























Female    0.327*** 
(0.088) 
  0.276*** 
(0.088) 
Age_30    0.804*** 
(0.189) 
  0.786*** 
(0.186) 
Age_40    0.802*** 
(0.207) 
  0.848*** 
(0.207) 
Age_50    0.719*** 
(0.192) 
  0.793*** 
(0.192) 
Age_60    0.372* 
(0.198) 
  0.422** 
(0.198) 
Age_70    0.130 
(0.201) 
  0.171 
(0.201) 
Munic    0.332*** 
(0.108) 
  0.356*** 
(0.108) 
Child    0.209* 
(0.120) 
  0.226* 
(0.119) 
Sch_child    0.344*** 
(0.110) 












0 b   -7.472  -3.400  10259.63  6737.55 
d   1.563  1.571  1.417  1.463 
N  2835  2298  2835  2298 
Log L  -2855.653  -2242.439  -2864.976  -2248.344 
LR chi2 (df)   76.56  192.88  57.92  181.07 
Notes: i)  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level respectively. 
           ii) Standard error in parentheses   35






Table A.6 Estimated demand for local public school expenditure, Second-step regression testing for Tiebout bias 
  Log-linear  Linear 
Elasticity  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
















Notes: i)  ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level respectively. 
           ii) Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
 